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CITIZENS UNITED AGAINST DISSENTING
SHAREHOLDERS
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission1 the Supreme Court struck
down the portion of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA") 2 that
prohibited corporations and trade unions from making direct contributions to political
candidates or making any indirect "expenditures that expressly advocate [for] the
election or defeat of [any] candidate." 3 In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy rejected
four grounds that the government had offered in support of the statute: 1) that corporate
campaign financing distorted the election marketplace by favoring wealthy
corporations;4 2) that corporate campaign financing fostered corruption or its appearance
by creating an opportunity for corporations and politicians to trade campaign
expenditures for political favors; 5 3) that corporate campaign expenditures in effect
compelled dissenting shareholders to fund political speech that they disagreed with;6 and
4) that corporate campaign financing allowed foreign individuals and associations to
influence American elections.7
While Justice Kennedy spent eight pages of his opinion discussing these
arguments, he dedicated less than half of a page to discussing the issue of compelled
speech by dissenting shareholders.8 This essay addresses that topic. In this essay I will
evaluate compelled political advocacy by corporations using principles from free speech
theory. Part I discusses the theory to be applied, Part II introduces Justice Kennedy's
opinion and describes the issue under free speech theory principles, Part III describes the
plight of the dissenting shareholder, Part IV illustrates the dilemma that dissenting
shareholders face when forced to choose between having their speech compelled or
being denied access to a wide range of investment opportunites, Part V demonstrates that
compelled corporate election expenditures are analogous to the type of government
compelled speech that the Supreme Court has found to violate the First Amendment, Part
VI argues that Congress should have a role in protecting the self-realization values of
dissenting shareholders, and Part VII summarizes and concludes.
1. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 203, 116 Stat. 91 (codified as 2
U.S.C. § 441(b)).
3. 130 S. Ct. at 887.
4. Id at 904-08.
5. Id. at 908-11.
6. Id. at 911.
7. Id.
8. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904-11.
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I. DEMOCRATIC FREE SPEECH THEORY
I begin this essay with the proposition that the individual, not the collective, is the
fundamental element of society. In an ideal world each individual would be at liberty to
determine his own actions, beliefs, and modes of expression. In a world of limited space
and scarce resources, however, the choices that individuals make come into conflict with
each other, and those conflicts must be resolved. The goal of democracy is to maximize
individual liberty within the constraints of a resource limited society.
A compatible view of the importance of individual choice has been well developed
by Professor Martin Redish. Professor Redish proposes that individual self-realization is
the primary goal of a true participatory democracy. 9 Democracy exists to secure
"individuals control [of] their own destinies and to enable them to develop their human
faculties through participation in the democratic process.10
According to Professor Redish, individual self-realization is an intentionally
ambiguous term that is meant to encompass the values liberty, autonomy, individual self-
fulfillment, and human development.11 In order to encourage self-realization, free speech
protection must do two things. First, it must "evaluate speech from the perspective of the
[listener]."l2 Speech is valuable in this context because it provides information that the
listener can use to make self-governing decisions. 13 The listener receives information
and uses it to determine what he believes and why he believes it. He uses information to
help him determine how he feels about a particular issue and to develop what he thinks is
the best course of action to effectuate his beliefs and interests. In this way, speech is
valuable in helping the listener to develop his human faculties and identity.
Second, free speech protection must evaluate speech from the perspective of the
speaker.14 Speech is valuable in this context because it provides the speaker with a way
to facilitate self-governing decisions.15 The speaker uses speech to make his preferences
known and to influence his fellow democratic citizens and legislators. In this way, the
speaker gains a measure of control over his own destiny by speaking. Because
individuals require speech to further their own self-realization, the government should
have no role in regulating speech unless there is a compelling interest in doing so.16
Professor Redish's theory of free speech (the "self-realization theory") provides
the framework that I will use to evaluate the government's argument that preventing
compelled speech of dissenting shareholders justifies regulation of corporate campaign
financing.17
9. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 601-11 (1982) (arguing that
democracy exists to enable individual self-realization).
10. Id. at 602-03.
11. Id.
12. Martin H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post's and Meiklejohn 's Mistakes: The
Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 1303, 1315
(2009).
13. Id. at 1315-16.
14. Id. at 1316.
15. Id.
16. Redish, supra note 9, at 625.
17. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, makes reference to this theory in stressing the importance of individual
free speech rights. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n., 130 S. Ct. 876, 972 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
410 Vol. 46:409
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11. CITIZENS UNITED AND THE THEORY OF FREE SPEECH
In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy quickly dismissed the government's argument
that regulation of corporate campaign financing is necessary to protect dissenting
shareholders from being forced to fund political speech.18 He offered three reasons to
support this rejection. First, Justice Kennedy believed that if the regulations were
allowed, nothing would prevent them from being applied to corporate owned newspapers
and other media companies, a result he deemed prohibited by the First Amendment. 19
Second, he found the BCRA to be under-inclusive because it only barred corporate
campaign financing within a specified time before the election, but allowed the same
potentially coerced expenditures outside of the specified time window.20 Finally, he
stated that the BCRA was over-inclusive because it barred expenditures by corporations
owned by single individuals, when such expenditures were clearly not coerced. 2 1
While Justice Kennedy states legitimate concerns about the BCRA, they are not
dispositive to the issue of protecting dissenting shareholders. His first objection - that
the BCRA could be applied to newspaper - while valid, does not argue against limiting
coerced political expenditures. Rather, it argues for recognizing an exception for the
press. One could argue that protection of the op-ed pieces and news stories that he fears
the BCRA would prohibit could be provided by exempting the press from regulation
because of its historical checking function on the government,22 or because the press is
expressly protected by the First Amendment's prohibition against abridging the freedom
of the press.23
His second objection - that the BCRA is underinclusive - could be cured
(oddly) by barring even more corporate campaign financing. His third objection - that
the BCRA would improperly regulate individually owned corporations - could be
easily cured by creating an exception for closely held corporations. In fact, Justice
Kennedy's third objection is overstated because the BCRA does permit corporations to
make political expenditures using shareholder approved funds, just not with funds from
the general treasury.24 Under the BCRA, corporations can form political action
dissenting) (noting that individual self-realization is one of the fundamental concerns that the First Amendment
seeks to protect).




22. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 225-49 (1989).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .... ) (emphasis added).
24. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(B) (2006).
It shall not be unlawful under this section for a corporation, a labor organization, or a separate
segregated fund established by such corporation or such labor organization, to make 2 written
solicitations for contributions during the calendar year from any stockholder, executive or
administrative personnel, or employee of a corporation or the families of such persons. A
solicitation under this subparagraph may be made only by mail addressed to stockholders, executive
or administrative personnel, or employees at their residence and shall be so designed that the
corporation, labor organization, or separate segregated fund conducting such solicitation cannot
determine who makes a contribution of $50 or less as a result of such solicitation and who does not
make such a contribution.
Id
41 120 1 1
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committees ("PACs"). Individual shareholders can then make personal contributions to
the PAC which can make unrestricted campaign expenditures. Overall, Justice
Kennedy's concerns support some "as applied" judicial exceptions to the BCRA, but not
a blanket invalidating of the entire statute.
More important for the purposes of this essay, however, Justice Kennedy did not
analyze the dissenting shareholder argument from the perspective of both the listener and
the speaker. The listener perspective offers no support for government regulation of
corporate speech. Corporate funded political advertisements provide information that the
electorate can use to make decisions, and clearly has value for First Amendment
purposes. It is the perspective of the speaker, however, that presents the more difficult
First Amendment issues.
If an individual made political campaign expenditures, the speech would certainly
be valuable in furthering that speaker's self-governing decisions. Corporations, however,
are owned by a collective of individual shareholders. If all of the shareholders held the
same political beliefs, then corporate political expenditures would be unproblematic and
such unified speech would further the shareholders' self-governing goals. The problem is
that it is unlikely that all shareholders in a corporation, particularly a large corporation,
will share the same set of political beliefs.25 When they do not all share the same set of
political beliefs, corporate expenditures of shareholder funds for political purposes can
be viewed as compelling dissenting shareholders to fund political views that they
disagree with.
This analysis will proceed in four parts. First, it will illustrate how a shareholder
could choose to invest in a corporation for the purpose of making a return on his
investment, yet dissent from the corporation's decision to spend money on political
advertisements for a particular candidate. Second, it will argue that tailoring investment
choices to avoid this compelled speech is not a viable option for most investors. Third, it
will demonstrate that under modern Supreme Court jurisprudence, spending of dissenting
shareholder funds on candidate advocacy is analogous to prohibited government
compelled speech. Finally, it will argue that the government has a role to play in
protecting the First Amendment rights of investors through the BCRA.
III. THE DISSENTING SHAREHOLDER
Determining the place of political speech in a corporation first requires an
examination of the purpose of corporations. Some argue that the government sanctioned
the creation of the corporate form26 as an egalitarian mechanism to allow the working
class to participate in equity ownership.27 Others argue that corporations were created in
25. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 912. Admittedly, this may not always be the case. As Justice Kennedy
notes, some corporations owned by a small group of individuals or a single individual, may share the same set
of political beliefs. Id. at 911.
26. Defined as an artificial legal personality that can own property, is divided into transferable shares, has
limited liability, and perpetual life.
27. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good for General Motors. Corporate
Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 235, 252-53 (1998) (positing that
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order to stimulate the kind of large scale investment that a national economy would
require; one that would enable old-money capitalists to get resources shipped from their
large western holdings to lucrative eastern markets.28 Both sides illustrate, however, that
corporations exist primarily to generate profit for shareholders, not as a vehicle for
expressing unified political opinion. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the vast
majority of corporations are owned by shareholders whose only common motivation is
the desire for a return on their investment.
The fact that shareholders share a common motivation for profit supports corporate
lobbying activity and political speech that are narrowly tailored to issues affecting the
corporation's business. It does not, however, support the type of direct candidate
advocacy or opposition that the BCRA attempts to prevent. A short example helps to
illustrate this point.
Suppose that Shareholder A owns 100 shares of Corporation X, a tire
manufacturer. Shareholder A is passionately anti-abortion, desires a ban on stem-cell
research, and does not want to pay for universal health care. Candidate 1 campaigns to
outlaw abortion, ban stem-cell research, preserve private health insurance, and reduce
tariffs on imported tires. Candidate 2 campaigns to preserve the woman's right to choose,
promote funding for stem-cell research, nationalize health insurance, and increase tariffs
on imported tires. While Shareholder A would likely appreciate the marginal increase in
corporate profits that might accrue from increased tariffs on tires, it is unlikely that this
marginal increase would be enough to get him to support Candidate 2. In other words,
Shareholder A would likely be willing to forgo a small increase in his return on
investment in order to support Candidate I who is more aligned with his political views.
Nonetheless, any political expenditure by Corporation X is likely tosupport Candidate 2
in order to increase corporate profits. In this example, Corporation X has used the funds
of Shareholder A to support the election of a candidate that he vehemently disagrees with
on nearly all issues.
If campaign financing by an individual is the equivalent of political speech that
furthers his interest in self-government, then compelled use of his funds by the
corporation to finance political speech that he disagrees with must be viewed as
interfering with his interest in self-government. While it is perhaps a reasonable
assumption that when they invest, individual shareholders are implicitly agreeing to fund
the type of advocacy that is narrowly tailored to advance corporate profits - for
example funding an advertisement that informs the electorate of the benefits of raising
tariffs on imported tires - it is not reasonable to assume that the shareholder has agreed
28. See, e.g., HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492-PRESENT 219-21, 254-57
(1980). Zinn states that during the "opening of the West ... capitalists of the East were conscious of the need
for . . . security [in their] own property. . . [M]ore capital was needed, more risks had to be taken, and a big
investment needed stability." Id. at 219. Thus, "government played its traditional role . . . of helping the
business interests," in part by "[giving] charters to corporations giving them legal rights to conduct business,
[and] raise money. . . ." Id. Zinn notes that while "Jacksonian Democracy" had attempted to build a popular
consensus for this new economic system, the system continued to exclude "[b]lacks, Indians, women,"
"foreigners," and working whites. Id. at 221. See also George Henry Evans, The Working Men's Declaration of
Independence, WORKINGMAN'S ADVOCATE (1829) ("The laws [of] private incorporations are all partial ...
favoring one class of society to the expense of the other. . . ."); WORKINGMEN'S PARTY OF ILLINOIS,
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1876) ("The present system has enabled capitalists to make laws in their
own interests to the injury and oppression of the workers.").
20 11 413
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to fund election advocacy of a candidate that he strongly opposes. From the speaker
perspective, this form of compelled speech has inhibited his path to self-realization.
IV. THE INVESTING DELIMMA
Individuals unsympathetic to the predicament faced by the dissenting shareholder
are likely to respond with something along the lines of "So what, tell him to sell his
damn shares if he disagrees," or "It's very easy to buy stock in individual companies that
you do agree with." In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy offered a similar rebuttal,
stating: "There is . .. little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by shareholders
'through the procedures of corporate democracy.' "29 The procedures that he refers to are
presumably the ability of shareholders to vote out boards of directors that they disagree
with or to file lawsuits against management.30 The flaw in these responses is that they
ignore the reality of modem investing.
These responses would have been highly relevant in the 1950s, when retail
investors directly owned over 90% of the stock in United States companies. 3 1 Today,
retail investors directly own less than one-third of the outstanding corporate equity in the
United States. The vast majority of shares in American corporations are held by
institutional investors and money managers.32 Shareholder investments today are
primarily held in institutional investment vehicles such as pension plans, deferred
compensation plans, 401(k)'s, 403(b)'s, Roth IRA's, individual IRA's, managed mutual
funds, and index funds. These investment vehicles are typically comprised of a diverse
array of investments including treasury bills, government bonds, municipal bonds,
corporate bonds, and corporate equity. The corporate equity component could consist of
shares of hundreds or thousands of individual companies. These institutional investments
are operated by professional money managers. Individual shareholders no longer
significantly participate in the "selection of individual stocks and engagement in the
process of corporate govemance." 3 3
The reason for this shift in investing is that significant participation in active
investing is not feasible for the average investor. Modem portfolio theory teaches that to
maximize their return on risk, investors should diversify their investment choices across
a broad range of asset classes, industries, and companies. 34 No longer is it considered
prudent for the investor to pick a handful of stocks that he or she considered "winners."
Instead, a wise investment strategy requires the investor to invest in hundreds or
29. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911 (quoting First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794
(1978)).
30. Id. (citing First Nat. Bank ofBoston, 435 U.S. at 794).
31. John C. Bogle, Individual Stockholder, R.I.P., WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2005, at Al6.
32. SEC. INDus. & FIN. MKTS. Ass'N, 2007 FACT BOOK 65 (Charles M. Bartlett, Jr. ed., 2007) (stating that
institutions held 73.4% of the market value of outstanding equity securities in 2006); Bogle, supra note 31, at
A16 (stating that institutions held 68% of all stocks in 2005); Daniel C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors,
and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1026 n.4 (2009) (stating that retail
investors directly own less than 30% of the stock in U.S. corporations).
33. Bogle, supra note 31, atAl6.
34. See generally HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF
INVESTMENTS (1959) [hereinafter MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION]; Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio
Selection, J. FINANCE 77 (1952) [hereinafter MARKOWITZ, Portfolio Selection].
414 Vol. 46:409
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thousands of different securities across the entire range of the economy.35 Doing this at
an individual level is out of reach for most investors because of the prohibitive cost of
diversifying at the individual level, the prohibitive time commitment required, and the
lack of expertise of the average investor.
To achieve diversification by purchasing hundreds or thousands of individual
securities across multiple asset classes and industries would require the individual
investor to engage in potentially thousands of individual transactions. The investor
would need to pay a broker to complete each transaction. Even using a discount broker,
implementing this strategy on an individual level would be cost-prohibitive. 36 Investing
in the type of institutional investment vehicles most commonly employed today3 7 takes
advantage of economies of scale and reduces the transaction costs for individual
investors to an affordable level.
Executing thousands of individual transactions also would require an extensive
amount of time that the average investor does not have. Not only would it require the
investor to research and then execute the initial transactions, but it would also necessitate
constant monitoring of each individual investment and continual follow-up transactions
to maintain the desired diversification balance. Such an undertaking would be a tall order
even if the investor had unlimited time to dedicate to investing. It is simply not feasible
for the average investor to make such a commitment while also juggling the demands of
a career and family. Institutional investment vehicles provide this service on an
aggregate level so that individual investors can have the benefit of diversification.
In addition to the cost and time required to individually create a diversified
investment portfolio, there is a large cost and time commitment involved in gaining the
expertise necessary to formulate, research, and implement a diversified investment
strategy. Professionals employed by companies offering institutional investment vehicles
have often spent years obtaining college educations in finance or economics.
Additionally, they spend a large portion of their professional lives keeping abreast of
advancements in investment theory and changes in asset classes, securities markets,
industries, and individual companies. The average investor is unable to spend the time or
resources necessary to obtain a similar level of expertise, and thus institutional
investment vehicles offer him the only feasible way to take advantage of such expertise.
In today's world of increased life spans and rising health costs, it is vital that
individuals have the ability to maximize their retirement savings. This requires that the
individual investor take advantage of a diversified portfolio of investments. As the
preceding paragraphs illustrate, however, it is not practical for the average investor to do
35. See generally MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION supra note 34; MARKOWITZ, Portfolio Selection
supra note 34.
36. See, e.g., TD AMERITRADE, http://www.tdameritrade.com/welcomel.html. (last visited Apr. 16, 2010).
TD Ameritrade, a discount broker, charges $9.99 per online trade. Executing 1,000 individual trades with
Ameritrade would therefore cost the investor $9,990. The cost of executing these trades alone would eliminate
a large portion of expected future gains for most small investors. Additional costs would be incurred each time
the investor was required to make additional transactions to rebalance his or her portfolio.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33. These investments include: pension plans, deferred
compensation plans, 401(k)'s, 403(b)'s, Roth IRA's, individual IRA's, managed mutual funds, and index
funds.
20 11 4 15
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so without placing his money into an institutional investment fund.38
Turning back to Justice Kennedy's rebuttal, to bring a lawsuit, vote against the
slate of directors, or divest himself of a particular stock, an individual shareholder would
have to look to each of his investment funds, each one potentially holding shares of
hundreds or thousands of different companies, determine which companies that he
owned stock in, and then monitor the campaign contributions of each of these
companies. The time commitment required is not feasible for the average investor. Nor is
it likely that the individual investor will be able to fund a lawsuit against a company that
he owns but a few shares in. If the dissenter is indeed in the minority, it is unlikely that
his vote will affect director elections. More importantly, should he desire to sell his
shares, the institutional fund that holds them will likely not be willing to bear the
administrative burden of allowing individual shareholders to divest themselves of
particular stocks held in the fund. Thus, today's investor is unable to effectively protect
his own speech using the tools of corporate governance.
In summary, the suggestion to "Just sell the damn shares," or utilize the tools of
corporate governance leaves the average investor in an untenable dilemma: either the
investor must forgo the opportunity to take advantage of the most prudent investment
strategy available to him, or submit to having his finances compelled to fund offensive
political speech.
V. COMPELLED SPEECH UNDER SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
To the extent that funding political expression is viewed as speech, it follows that
having one's money used to fund political expression is also speech. If one disagrees
with the use of his money to fund political expression that he opposes, and it is used
anyway, it is compelled speech.39 Two distinct dangers arise from coercing individual
shareholders to fund political advocacy. First, there is a risk that the audience of the
political advocacy will be confused as to the strength of the position that the corporation
is advocating. 40 Despite the fact that there may be a large number of dissenting
shareholders that oppose the political advocacy of the corporation, the use of their money
38. It is worth noting a recent trend in investing, styled "green investments." See Investopedia.com,
Investment Question: What are Green Investments?, http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/07/green-
investments.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2010). Green investments are an attempt to offer investors a way to
exercise their political preferences by creating investment vehicles containing the shares of "socially
responsible," or "environmentally friendly" firms. While these vehicles can be viewed as a positive step
towards furthering the self-realization goals of individual investors, they do not solve the problem of
compelling dissenting shareholder advocacy of political candidates that is the subject of this essay.
39. It is of little matter that in the case of shareholder money being used to fund corporate political speech
that the individual shareholder may be compelled to have only a small amount of his money used or that he
may not be aware of every instance in which it is being used. To illustrate this, it is instructive to look at an
example from the perspective of the listener. If a small amount of information in the marketplace of ideas were
censored, it would be no answer that the amount censored was small or that the listener was unaware that it was
being censored. The act of censorship would interfere with the rights of the listener regardless of the amount of
censorship or whether the listener was aware of the censorship. The rights of the speaker are violated in the
same way by compelled speech, regardless of the amount of speech that is compelled or whether the speaker is
aware that his speech is being compelled.
40. See Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in First Amendment Theory:
Redistributive Values and the Democratic Dilemma, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 1083, 1114 (1999) ("[C]ompelled
speech harms the interests of free expression by [] confusing the populace as to the actual strength and
popularity of substantive positions advocated by [the party compelling the speech].").
416 Vol. 46:409
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to fund the advocacy risks deceiving the audience into believing that the viewpoint is
widely held. Listeners may view the marketplace of ideas as wholeheartedly endorsing
Candidate 241 when in fact there is substantial reasoned disagreement. Second,
compelled use of a dissenting shareholder's money to fund political advocacy that is
abhorrent to him dilutes the effectiveness of the dissenting shareholder's own message. 42
A shareholder who is a passionate advocate for Candidate I will have his expression
diluted by a corporation that uses his money to fund attack ads against Candidate 1 or
support ads for Candidate 2.
It is clear that if a unit of the government used citizens' money to fund this type of
political advocacy, it would be compelled speech under current Supreme Court
jurisprudence. It is a violation of an individual's First Amendment rights for a
government actor to require an individual to fund political advocacy that he disagrees
with, unless the advocacy in question is part of a larger program that is viewpoint
neutral. In Wooley v. Maynard, the Court held that the First Amendment protected not
only an individual's right to speak, but also the individual's right to refrain from
speaking at all.43 Thus, the state could not require an individual to display the political
motto "Live Free or Die" on his license plate. 44 In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,
a case in which a public teachers union used union dues to fund advocacy of political
candidates, the Court held that the First Amendment protects an individual from being
compelled to fund political advocacy that he finds objectionable. 45 In University of
Wisconsin v. Southworth, the Court held that a public university could not use student
activity fees to fund political advocacy that was objectionable to individual students,
unless such advocacy was part of a larger program that was viewpoint neutral. 46
In none of these cases did the Court suggest that an acceptable solution would be
for the individual to forgo the opportunity to be a teacher, to attend a public university,
or to drive a car. Implicitly the Court recognized that these are important opportunities,
and explicitly held that the government could not require an individual to fund distasteful
political advocacy in order to take advantage of them.4 7 Under the Court's compelled
speech jurisprudence, therefore, if corporations were run by the government, the use of
dissenting shareholder money to fund election advocacy of a particular candidate would
be a violation of the shareholder's First Amendment rights. It is clear that the Court
would not require an individual to choose between forgoing the opportunity to invest in
the stock market or being compelled to fund political advocacy.
Most corporations, however, are not run by the government. The question,
therefore, is not whether the First Amendment protects individuals from being compelled
to speak by a corporation - it does not - but rather, whether consistent with the First
41. See supra Section III.
42. See Redish & Kaludis, supra note 40, at 1114 ("[C]ompelled speech harms the interests of free
expression by. . . diluting the force of the speaker's persuasiveness in the eyes of his listeners.").
43. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("We begin with the proposition that the right of
freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.").
44. Id. at 707, 717.
45. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-36 (1977).
46. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221 (2000).
47. See supra notes 43-46.
2011 417
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Amendment the government can regulate corporations in order to protect individuals
from being compelled to speak.
VI. PROMOTING SPEECH AND PROTECTING DISSENT
It is usual to think of the government as a threat to free speech when it makes laws
that pertain to speech. Private entities, however, can also be a threat to free speech when
the government has bestowed them with legal entitlements delegating control over the
speech of individuals.4 8 Corporations are such a case. The government has sanctioned
the corporate form, endowed it with limited liability and perpetual life, and enabled
corporations to legally collect investment money from individual shareholders through
the sale of shares. The fact that corporations are entitled to use a shareholder's money to
fund political candidate ads that the shareholder opposes is a threat to the shareholder's
ability to refrain from speaking. It is therefore a threat to the individual's self-realization
from the perspective of the speaker. Because the government was responsible for
granting the corporation with the entitlements that enable this action, the government
should also have a role in protecting the self-realization values of the individual
shareholder.
The Court has taken this problem seriously in the past, stating "[C]ontributions by
corporations to any political committee or for any political purpose should be forbidden
by law; directors should not be permitted to use stockholders' money for such
purposes... ."49 The BCRA provided a potential solution to this problem through the
use of Political Action Committees (PACs). Under the BCRA, a corporation could form
a PAC, and solicit money from individual shareholder's to fund direct advocacy of
political candidates.50 If a shareholder affirmatively agrees for his money to be used for
such advocacy, the funds that he designates are held in the PAC and segregated from the
corporation's general treasury. The corporation can then use the money collected by the
PAC to fund advertisements that directly advocate for or against political candidates. In
this way, PACs allow willing corporate shareholders to continue to express political
views that provide information to listeners. 5 1 Because these funds have been expressly
contributed by willing shareholders, it simultaneously eliminates coercion of unwilling
shareholders. In this way, PACs promote the self-realization values of willing corporate
speakers and the self-realization values of the audience of corporate speech, while
protecting the self-realization values of dissenting shareholders that choose to refrain
from such speech.
While the BCRA prevents a corporation from using shareholder money from the
48. See, e.g., CAss R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 43-51 (1993)
(describing that, for example, government grants of exclusive broadcast licenses and the enforcement of their
exclusivity enable private broadcasters to prevent the broadcasting of views that they disagree with).
49. United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 572 (1957) (quoting Theodore Roosevelt). Justice Stevens also
notes that "a respect for the interest of shareholders and members in preventing the use of their money to
support candidates they opposed" was one of the justifications of the BCRA. Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm'n., 130 S. Ct. 876, 953 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(B) (reprinted at note 24, supra).
51. As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, nothing in the BCRA prevents owners of "mom & pop"
corporations from contributing their own money outside of the corporation, or from contributing it through the
corporation via a PAC. See 130 S. Ct. at 943 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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general treasury to fund advertisements that expressly advocate for or against a political
candidate, it does not prevent the corporation from using money from the general
treasury to fund political issue ads. 52 Thus, corporate management remains free to fund
advocacy concerning issues that are more narrowly tailored to meet the corporation's
profit goals. For instance, a domestic tire manufacturer could spend money on election
advertisements that illustrate the benefits of increased tariffs and encourage the electorate
to back candidates and legislation that support increased tire tariffs. Thus, while the
BCRA prohibits corporations from using the money of dissenting shareholders to fund
advocacy of political candidates, it allows the corporation to directly fund advocacy of
political issues, and to fund advocacy of political candidates through PACs.
One potential rebuttal against the use of PACs is that they are a less efficient
mechanism for funding political speech than direct funding by the corporation. That
argument would stress that shareholders have contributed their money to management,
and have entrusted management with using their money in a way that best promotes
corporate profits. If management determines that funding campaign advertisements for
Candidate 2 is the best way to promote corporate profits, then any limitation on
management's ability to do so comes at the expense of corporate efficiency and
ultimately profit.
This argument is not without merit. If management determines that advertisements
for Candidate 2 are the best way to increase corporate profits, then a mechanism that
allows shareholders to decline to fund such advertisements will likely lead to less
funding, and ultimately less promotion of corporate profits. While PACs may be
somewhat less effective than direct funding by the corporation, however, they still allow
the corporation to perform a valuable service in the promotion of self-realization by its
shareholders. PACs allow the corporation to enable individual citizens to aggregate their
money in an association for the purpose of promoting their political goals. Not only does
the PAC significantly reduce the transaction costs involved with individual advocacy,
but it also allows its members to enjoy the economies of scale involved with buying large
amounts of advertising time. Thus, PACs promote the self-realization goals of
conforming shareholders while protecting the self-realization goals of dissenting
shareholders.
In this light, the BCRA can be viewed as an attempt by Congress to preserve the
self-realization goals of both corporate speakers and audiences, while at the same time
protecting the self-realization goals of dissenting shareholders. Under the First
Amendment, no voluntary speech has been abridged. To the contrary, compelled speech
is reduced because a mechanism has been put in place to ensure that speakers who wish
to speak can, while those that would rather refrain may. It could be argued that these
regulations may come at the expense of some corporate profits, but regulating corporate
profit making activity is well within Congress' Commerce Clause power. Thus, Congress
may constitutionally regulate corporate activity for the purpose of promoting First
Amendment values. Under self-realization theory, therefore, the government's argument
that the BCRA is necessary to protect dissenting shareholders is a valid one.
52. Prohibited "electioneering communications" are only those that "refer[] to a clearly identified candidate
for Federal office." 2 U.S.C. § 434 (f)(3)(A)(i)(I).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Free speech under the First Amendment should be evaluated using a theory that
promotes individual self-realization by assessing the speech's value to both the listener
and the speaker. Self-realization theory would uphold regulation that protects dissenting
shareholders from being compelled to speak by a corporation, while preserving the
ability (through PACs) of other individuals to associate in a corporation and fund
political speech. Under the self-realization theory of free speech the BCRA would be a
constitutional exercise of congressional power.53
-Russell Mangas
53. Subject to the exceptions discussed supra Part II in the text accompanying notes 23-25.
420 Vol. 46:409
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 46 [2010], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol46/iss3/3
